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ISP Licensing-A Carrot to the Stick of
Three-Strikes Laws
Steven Masur * and Cynthia Katz * *
I. INTRODUCTION
The law and business of media distribution in the United States devel-
oped in a world in which media was distributed using technologies controlled
by a value chain of rights holders and distributors. Advances in digital distri-
bution technologies and widespread use of the Internet have moved media
distribution technology directly into the hands of consumers or creative
members of the general public. This sea of change calls for an examination
of how U.S. copyright law applies to new business models that take advan-
tage of these technologies. One proposal, which has garnered a significant
amount of attention in the United States, is collective rights licensing at the
Internet Service Provider (ISP) level.' In short, the proposal is that a fee for
the use and sharing of media accessed on the Internet should be applied at the
point of access: the ISP.2
Since the early days of media distribution on the Internet, a wide variety
of individuals and industry groups have suggested collective compensation
schemes to compensate rights holders for content accessed on the Internet.
The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) has been a proponent of this con-
cepts since as early as 2003.3 Groups such as Choruss are currently attempt-
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1. See Frank Rose, Music Industry Proposes a Piracy Surcharge on ISPs, WIRED,
Mar. 13, 2008, available at http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music/news/
2008/03/musiclevy?
2. Id.
3. Fred von Lohmann, A Better Way Forward: Voluntary Collective Licensing of
Music File Sharing, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, Apr. 30, 2008, avail-
able at http://www.eff.org/files/eff-a-better-way-forward.pdf.
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ing to get the idea off the ground by working with U.S. universities to build a
small music-royalty fee into tuition payments in order to legalize music
swapping through file sharing.4 The idea is beginning to gain traction in the
recording industry with Warner Music Group leading the way and EMI Mu-
sic and Universal Music Group also expressing interest.
While there have been many proposals for collective-rights licensing
schemes, most proposals fall into two camps: a new legislatively introduced
public right,5 or a privately implemented opt-in arrangement. 6 Under the for-
mer, the government-mandated public right is collected as a payment on a
user's ISP or mobile-phone bill and distributed through a third party organi-
zation to rights holders.7 Under the latter, rights holders would sign a cove-
nant not to sue any user who opts-in to pay licensing fees for content
accessed by that user.8
II. CURRENT U.S. LAW AND PRACTICE
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, also known as the
Intellectual Property Clause, is the basis for U.S. copyright law.9 This provi-
sion gives Congress the power to grant creators of original works exclusive
rights in relation to their works over a limited period of time.1o In the Feder-
alist Papers, James Madison wrote of the Congress's copyright authority that
"the utility of this power will scarcely be questioned."11 U.S. copyright law
seeks to incentivize artists, authors, musicians, artisans, and other creators
through this limited monopoly.12 The Copyright Act of 1976, Title 17 of the
U.S. Code, is the current federal statute governing U.S. copyright law.13 This
provision of the Code protects original works of authorship fixed in tangible
mediums of expression. It affords copyright owners a distinctive bundle of
rights to control, and the copyright owners may financially benefit from the
4. Eliot Van Buskirk, Three Major Record Labels Join the 'Choruss,' WIRED,
Dec. 8, 2008, available at http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2008/12/warner-
music-gr/.
5. Rose, supra note 1.
6. von Lohmann, supra note 3.
7. Rose, supra note 1.
8. von Lohmann, supra note 3.
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (empowering Congress "[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and In-
ventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries") (em-
phasis added).
10. Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection and Representation
of Facts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1569 (1963).
I1. THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison).
12. Gorman, supra note 10, at 1569.
13. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2009).
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exploitation of their works.14 In particular, Section 106 of the Code imparts
on all copyright proprietors the exclusive right to reproduce and adapt their
works. In the case of literary, musical, dramatic and choreographic works,
pantomimes and motion pictures, and other audiovisual works, the owners
have the right to perform and display their works. And in the case of sound
recordings, they retain the right to perform their works publicly by means of
a digital audio transmission.15 When Internet users stream, download,
upload, and otherwise share copyrighted content over the Internet without
permission from the rights holders, they are reproducing, displaying, and
publicly performing others' works.16 Under Section 501 of the Copyright
Act, this constitutes copyright infringement.17
Millions of users have seized the opportunities that digital technology
provides to obtain and share creative works without permission. On the In-
ternet, sharing copyrighted material that has not been paid for has become a
mainstream pursuit. The vast majority-90% or more-of peer-to-peer
(P2P) file transfers are in violation of copyright laws and threaten the viabil-
ity of U.S. businesses that depend on copyright protection.18 The collateral
damage from digital piracy includes: (1) a dramatic reduction in sales for
record and motion picture companies that many believe is the direct result of
file sharing,' 9 (2) the suppression of overall economic growth,20 (3) the
thwarting of innovation,21 and (4) an onslaught of litigation.22 For example,
the movie The Dark Knight was reportedly illegally downloaded more than
seven million times within a couple of months of its release, despite Warner
14. See, e.g., id. at §§ 102, 106.
15. Id. at § 106.
16. See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2009).
17. Id.
18. RICHARD COTTON & MARGARET L. TOBEY, NBC UNIVERSAL, COMMENTS OF
NBC UNIVERSAL INC., IN THE MATTER OF BROADBAND INDUSTRY PRACTICES 2
(FCC June 15, 2007), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/
view?id=6519528962.
19. Stephen E. Siwek, The True Cost of Motion Picture Piracy to the U.S. Econ-
omy, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY INNOVATION, IPI Policy Report 186, i (Sep. 9,
2006), available at http://www.ipi.org/IPI%5CIPIPublications.nsflPublication
LookupFullTextPDF/293C69E7D5055FA486257 I F800168459/$File/CostOf
Piracy.pdf?OpenElement.
20. Id. at 4.
21. Tad Crawford, Publishing in the Age of Digital Piracy, AIGA, Mar. 23, 2010,
available at http://www.aiga.org/content.cfm/publishing-in-the-age-of-digital-
piracy.
22. The RIAA Responds: "Our Efforts Have Made a Real Difference. . . " DIGITAL
Music NEWS, Aug. 01, 2010, available at http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/
stories/080 110riaa.
2852010]1
SMU Science and Technology Law Review
Brothers' aggressive anti-piracy campaign.23 While it is debatable that recent
losses in the entertainment industry are the result of file sharing alone, there
is no doubt that those losses have caused significant harm to the overall U.S.
economy. American industries that rely heavily on copyright protection to
generate revenue are among the most important growth-drivers of the U.S.
economy, contributing nearly 40% of the growth achieved by all U.S. private
industry and nearly 60% of the growth of the total U.S. exportable prod-
ucts. 2 4 It has been reported that roughly 40% of the U.S. gross domestic
product is affected by the inadequate protection of intellectual property, and
U.S. losses widely attributed to piracy are staggering.25
Documenting the scope and scale of the infringement taking place on
the Internet and seeking legal recourse against culpable individuals have
proven to be overwhelmingly costly and time consuming.26 For example, the
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) has sued more than
30,000 individuals in the past five years. 27 But most of these cases have
resulted in settlements, and this strategy has done very little to stem the tide
of uncompensated use of copyrighted works on the Internet.28 Furthermore,
efforts to pursue infringers have not only led to a backlash of consumer criti-
cism, but the RIAA has yet to make a significant dent in the amount of
piracy.29 In the digital era, the ubiquity and worldwide scope of electronic
distribution networks, the ease and speed of technologically assisted repro-
duction, and the overall financial stakes involved have increased both the
complexity of and necessity for effective management of copyrights in sound
recordings and other forms of intellectual property.
III. A GOVERNMENT-MANDATED PIBLIC RIGHT
As a possible solution to the problems associated with digital piracy, a
wide range of proponents have begun espousing government-mandated col-
23. Brian Stelter & Brad Stone, Digital Pirates Winning Battle with Major
Hollywood Studios, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2009, available at http://www.ny
times.com/2009/02/05/business/media/05piracy.html.
24. Siwek, supra note 19, at 1.
25. Press Release, Recording Industry Association of America, RIAA Comments
on U.S. Trade Rep's Special 301 Report Highlighting Piracy Issues in Key
International Markets (Apr. 5, 2008), available at http://www.riaa.com/new-
sitem.php?news-month filter-4&news-year filter-2008&resultpage=&id=A0
ODE818-FFE8-0579-F4CA-9D5ACBBE143B.
26. See, e.g., David Kravets, RIAA Thomas Appeal Denied; Retrial Likely to Set








lective rights licensing.30 These supporters contend that recent experience
has shown that the market cannot solve this problem on its own and that the
government needs to step in.31 Proponents of government-mandated collec-
tive-rights licensing also argue that Congress should amend the copyright
laws to create a right to collect reasonable fees from all Internet users at their
point of access in exchange for the ability to consume music and other copy-
righted intellectual property on the Internet.32 The most publicized model
would require all U.S. ISPs and university networks to add a fee (figures
around $5 are being proposed) to their usual charges and funnel the money
collected to one or more collective rights organizations (CRO).33 In order to
collect their portion of the fee, artists and other rights holders would be re-
quired to join a CRO, and each CRO would be responsible for distributing
the proceeds received from the ISPs among its members based upon a
formula reflecting the value of the works or the number of times the works
are exploited by Internet users.34 The ISP's role in collecting fees would
warrant retention of a small percentage of the fees collected to be used for
investment in network capacity and to pay for up-to-date content identifica-
tion and monitoring technologies.35 According to some, the fees collected
would create a pool as large as $20 billion annually to pay artists and copy-
right holders.36
IV. PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED COLLECTIVE RIGHTS LICENSING
REGIMES
According to Warner Music Group executive Jim Griffin, "[c]ollective
licensing is what people do when they lose control, or when control is no
longer practical or efficient."37 Music composition copyright holders and
songwriters faced a similar loss of control over exploitation of their works in
the early 1900s; therefore, U.S. precedent exists for collective rights licens-
30. See id.
31. See William W. Fisher III, An Alternative Compensation System, PROMISES TO
KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 1, 3-4 (2004),
available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/PTKChapter6.pdf.
32. Id.
33. Sam Gustin, Music Outlaws, There's a New Sheriff in Town, WIRED (Mar. 27,
2008), available at http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music/news/2008/03/
portfolio_0327.
34. Fisher, supra note 31, at 3-4.
35. Christian L. Castle & Amy E. Mitchell, What's Wrong With ISP Music Licens-
ing?, 26 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 4, 7 (2008).
36. See Gustin, supra note 33.
37. Id.
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ing.38 Implementation of a government-mandated public right would be sim-
ilar to collective licensing of musical compositions and the administrative
functions of the performance rights organizations (PROs) that currently han-
dle the collection and distribution of performance royalties for musical com-
positions. 39 The 1897 revision of the U.S. Copyright Act established-for
the first time-a songwriter's exclusive right of public performance.40 Song-
writers and composers needed a way to enforce their right of the public per-
formance of their musical compositions and most, if not all, did not have the
resources to police every theater, bar, restaurant, and hotel to make sure the
proprietors of those establishments were paying for a license to play their
music.41 It was impractical, and likely impossible, for the owners of these
establishments to obtain a license from each rights-holder of each musical
composition being played on any given night.42 PROs were needed for effi-
ciency and practicality.43 Under authorization of its member songwriters and
publishers, the first PRO in the United States-the American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP)-proceeded to grant blanket
licenses to any establishment or service that was operated for a profit and
played music.44
In 1923, the District Court of New Jersey handed down a landmark de-
cision for performance rights. The court held that songs played during radio
broadcasts were played for profit and required a license from the rights-hold-
ers of the song.45 In 1926, the advent of coast-to-coast radio networks cre-
ated an incredible source of revenue for songwriters and music publishers.46
However, negotiations between radio broadcasters and the ASCAP regarding
licensing rates became more and more difficult as the years passed. Due to
the difficulties in negotiations with ASCAP, in 1940, a group of broadcast-
38. J. Michael Keyes, Musical Musings: The Case for Rethinking Music Copyright
Protection, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 407, 413 (2004).
39. Rose, supra note 1.




44. See, e.g., id.
45. M. Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 F. 776, 780 (D.N.J. 1923),
noted in Robert P. Merges, The Continuing Vitality of Music Performance
Rights Organizations 17-18 (UC BERKELEY PUB. LAW RESEARCH PAPER No.
1266870, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=1266870 (follow "One-Click Download" hyperlink).
46. Robert P. Merges, The Continuing Vitality of Music Performance Rights Orga-
nizations 17-18 (UC BERKELEY PUB. LAW RESEARCH PAPER No. 1266870,
2008), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
1266870 (follow "One-Click Download" hyperlink).
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ers-consisting of major radio networks and almost five hundred indepen-
dent radio stations-formed a second PRO, known as Broadcast Music, Inc.
(BMI).47 Paul Heineke, a European music publisher, established the third
PRO in the United States in 1931, known as the Society of European Stage
Authors and Composers (SESAC).48 Today, ASCAP and BMI represent the
majority of songwriters and music publishers, with SESAC licensing about
1% of all performance rights in the United States.
By agreement, music publishers grant to the PRO the right to license all
of the songs controlled by the music publisher. A PRO's repertoire is the
PRO's entire collection of songs from the thousands of songwriters and mu-
sic publishers who have entered into agreements with the PRO. As a result,
in the United States, any user of publicly performed music-be it a theater,
hotel, restaurant, club, bar or radio station-must pay to the PROs an annual
fee for a blanket license to publicly perform any or all of the songs in each
PRO's repertoire an unlimited number of times.49 The PROs then collect the
royalties from these licenses and pay out to publishers and songwriters their
respective shares. The amount of royalties is determined according to com-
plicated calculations, including the frequency with which each song was
played. The PRO pays the publisher's share (50%) directly to the publisher
and the songwriter's share (50%) directly to the songwriter.
Proponents of a new digital right argue that just as radio networks cre-
ated an incredible source of revenue for songwriters and PROs allowed song-
writers and music publishers to reap the financial rewards of widespread
exploitation of their works, government-mandated collective rights licensing
of media files distributed using the Internet represents a way for copyright
holders to reap the financial rewards of this new means of widespread ex-
ploitation.50 Proponents argue that a compulsory license fee should be
charged because most files are shared on the Internet for free. Such a fee
would avoid the difficulty of either elucidating or renegotiating contractual
claims.51 Supporters also propose that society would benefit from lower
transaction costs and less litigation because the act of sharing content on the
Internet would be legitimized and compensated. Finally, supporters of a new
digital right advocate the concept that a marketplace of competing file shar-
47. Tradition, BMI.com, http://www.bmi.com/aboutlentry/533105 (last visited
Aug. 29, 2010).
48. About SESAC, SESAC.com, http://www.sesac.com/About/History.aspx (last
visited Aug. 29, 2010).
49. About ASCAP, ASCAP.com, http://www.ascap.com/about/ (last visited Aug.
29, 2010).
50. Joseph Merante, Role in the Remedy: Finding a Place for ISPs in the Digital
Music World, 29 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 387, 388 (2009).
51. Id.
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ing and streaming applications and ancillary services could develop in a le-
gal-instead of illegal-setting.52
V. CONSUMER BEHAVIOR IN AN AGE OF FREE ACCESS
Many supporters of collective licensing argue that free access to unlim-
ited media on the Internet is a public good. Conversely, an increasing num-
ber of other countries are introducing a "three-strikes-and-you're-out" type of
legislation, in which a user repeatedly found downloading copyrighted mate-
rial will lose access to the Internet at home.53 Questions remain as to
whether these measures will realistically serve to keep prosecuted file-sharers
off of the Internet or if such a goal is even desirable. But given the possibil-
ity that the United States could adopt similar legislation, it is worth under-
standing how free access to a nearly unlimited repertoire of music, film,
pictures, and text has affected U.S. society.
The numbers show that the desire of consumers to experience music,
motion pictures and other forms of multimedia products-and to express
themselves through music and video-continues to increase. For example, in
2006, websites featuring user-generated media content attracted sixty-nine
million users in the United States alone, and they are projected to attract 101
million U.S. users by 2011.54 The number of U.S. households with broad-
band access that watched full-length movies and television shows online
doubled in the past year, according to research firm Parks Associates.55 Ac-
cording to BigChampagne, an online media measurement company, the aver-
age simultaneous P2P population grew from over five million users in
December 2002 to over seven million users by December 2004, and there
continues to be an increase in P2P populations year after year.56 The
proliferation of music, video and photographic editing software, coupled with
the distribution power offered by P2P networks has fueled a new generation
of creative expression. Rather than being limited to a handful of authorized
services like Apple's iTunes or RealNetworks's Rhapsody, access to unlim-
52. Id.
53. Mathew Ingram, RIAA Drops Lawsuit Strategy for "Three Strikes" Plan,
GIGAOM (Dec. 19, 2008), http://gigaom.com/2008/12/19/riaa-drops-lawsuit-
strategy-for-three-strikes-plan/.
54. INTERACTIVE ADVERTISING BUREAU, IAB PLATFORM STATUS REPORT: USER
GENERATED CONTENT, SOCIAL MEDIA, AND ADVERTISING-AN OVERVIEW, 1
(2008), http://www.iab.net/media/file/2008_ugc-platform.pdf.
55. See Greg Sandoval, Hulu's Backers Bicker as Web Video Soars, MEDIA MAV-
ERICK (Nov. 16, 2009, 10:45 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3-
10398698-261.html.
56. Adam Toll, BigChampagne LLC, Peer-to-Peer Filesharing Technology: Con-
sumer Protection and Competition Issues 3, Presentation at the FTC Workshop:




ited media from any source has increased the number of cultural reference
points from which artists draw to create new works. As a result, it is easy to
argue that free access to media on the Internet has contributed to a better
educated public, and that both the volume and quality of artistic output have
increased as a result of it. It is clear that sections of the population who
could not previously afford access to certain artistic works, cultural reference
points or research materials can now get them free with a three-hundred dol-
lar netbook computer and an Internet connection. This may serve to decrease
the "digital divide." For instance, "getting information online saves the cost
of printing textbooks, and this is a case where what is cheaper is also bet-
ter . . . the computer can serve as a library, a laboratory and an art studio,
saving the cost of these or making those that exist far more effective."57
Furthermore, we have already seen with services like Flickr, Twitter and
YouTube, that disseminate news, picture and video collections to millions of
Internet users has increased the number of data points from which our news
is collected, improving, theoretically, how much we learn about what is hap-
pening in the world. Similarly, millions of consumers with unlimited access
to the world's media collection will preserve and foster its growth. Fans
sharing media may be the best distributors, decision makers, and preservers
of media-all of which were previously costly roles for media companies to
fulfil. For example, MusicBrainz, a user-maintained community music
metadatabase, has already compiled information covering 9,605,951 tracks
and 813,659 album releases.58 Additionally, Gracenote, a wholly owned sub-
sidiary of the Sony Corporation of America that provides technology for dig-
ital media, points out that media management is critical to a user's
experience and it begins with the user.59 If these activities were made legal,
it could aid in the claiming of "orphan works." Automated submission pro-
cess services might evolve for copyright owners to register their works with
the appropriate databases in order to collect payment of rights licenses.60 For
all of these reasons, it is important not to dismiss the possibility that free
access to media on the Internet could be desirable. Evolved business models
may be the missing piece needed to fund such projects.
57. Seymour Papert, Professor, Mass. Inst. Tech., quoted in Clint Witchalls, Bridg-
ing the Digital Divide, THE GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 17, 2005, at Technology
Guardian section 23, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2005/
feb/I7/olpc.onlinesupplement.
58. Database Statistics, MusicBRAINZ, http://musicbrainz.org/show/stats/ (last vis-
ited May 26, 2010).
59. About Us, GRACENOTE, http://www.gracenote.com/company-info/ (last visited
May 26, 2010).
60. Merante, supra note 50, at 388.
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VI. ISSUES WITH IMPLEMENTATION
In order to implement a mandatory collective rights licensing system,
the copyright provisions in Section 17 of the U.S. Code would need to be
revised. For this to occur, a bill setting forth the revisions would need to be
introduced and lobbied through Congress. If experience with the DMCA is
any guide, this would involve months of negotiations in congressional com-
mittees, and it might be years before the resulting language is brought to a
vote.
Specific revisions that would be required include a licensing scheme
that authorizes ISP customers to copy, display, and publicly perform works
downloaded from and uploaded to computers connected to the Internet. Such
rights were previously reserved exclusively for owners of the copyrighted
material in question, so we can presume that those copyright owners will
want to have a say in deciding how the licensing scheme would work. The
legislation would also need to describe in some detail the entity responsible
for accounting to the rights holders and possibly provide guidelines for mea-
suring how much to pay particular rights holders.61 We must presume that
rights holders would retain their rights to sue Internet users for direct in-
fringement if they fail to pay the fees or otherwise circumvent the system.
Similarly, we would guess that ISPs would remain secondarily liable for cop-
yright infringement if they failed to properly account to the CROs for all of
the fees collected from their customers.
Proponents of government-mandated collective rights licensing have yet
to address whether copyright holders would retain the exclusive right to cre-
ate, authorize derivatives of, and otherwise retain control over their works.
Furthermore, debate continues as to which activities constitute fair use of a
copyrighted work. According to the Copyright Act, fair use permits the re-
production of copyrighted works without the authorization of the copyright
holder "for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching,
scholarship, or research."62 Before bringing a claim of copyright infringe-
ment, copyright holders must first recognize and assess the merits of a fair-
use affirmative defense. Given the lack of consistency shown by courts in
recent cases on the topic, this assessment has become increasingly complex.63
61. In the past, for example, with the performance right collection societies, and in
regard to collection of mechanical rights by Harry Fox, an actual existing or-
ganization was not designated. Rather, the attributes required for such an or-
ganization, or the requirements for proper payment of compulsory licensing
fees or collection of blanket licensing fees, were described in the statute in
question.
62. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
63. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569. 592 (1994) (reasoning that
court must distinguish between criticism that lowers demand and infringement
that destroys it); see also Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1078-79
(2d Cir. 1992) (explaining that use is fair when only marginal amounts of mate-
rial are taken, and this taking would not affect the marketability of the copy-
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Perhaps the legislative implementation process will help clarify what consti-
tutes fair use, since some of the downloaded material arguably falls under the
current definition. Regardless of the outcome, users who claim that exploita-
tion of intellectual property on the Internet constitutes fair use will undoubt-
edly contest the imposition of any mandatory fees for access to these
copyrighted works. Given the consent decree under which both ASCAP and
BMI currently operate, Congress will need to remain alert to any antitrust
concerns presented by the CROs assigned the task of collecting fees.64
Opponents of compulsory collective licensing argue that it amounts to a
tax for consumption of intellectual property on the Internet, with the cost
equally allocated to all users regardless of their individual consumption level.
Opponents point to the inequity inherent in forcing some users to subsidize
the activities of others. Consumers with strong moral and ethical positions
would be financially supporting content to which they may be morally or
ethically opposed.65 Finally, data collection and use practices would need to
conform to the requirements of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA) so that private information, including personal media consumption
data, is not sold without consent.
The logistics of data collection and measurement give rise to a variety
of potential problems. New standards must be created for an entire market of
Internet media tracking, security, usage measurement, cyber investigation,
and royalty collection firms. For instance, one technology-driven media-
measurement company, BigChampagne, uses its software to create a real-
time map of music downloading.66 This map is created by matching partial
IP addresses to zip codes.67 However, without empirical proof showing
which company's technology is best for measuring media consumption, op-
ponents insist that ISPs and CROs would merely be providing "good
guesses" as to how the collected fees should be distributed.68 The burden of
making these calculations-along with the cost of inherent negotiation and
litigation that would arise-would fall upon music and media royalty ac-
counting firms. The result would be a staggering workload that many of
these firms may find themselves ill-equipped to handle. Furthermore, ISPs
might be subject to additional accounting duties and would, therefore, find
righted work); see also Penelope v. Brown, 792 F. Supp. 132, 136 (D. Mass.
1992) (explaining that factors listed in § 107 are not the only factors a court
should consider, nor are they determinative).
64. See von Lohmann, supra note 3.
65. Neil Desai, Copyright and Culture (Voluntary Collective Licensing-Innova-
tion or Extortion?) Annotated Bibliography, http://tags.library.upenn.edu/pro-
ject/40857 (last visited Aug. 20, 2010).
66. Jeff Howe, BigChampagne is Watching You, WIRED (Oct. 2003), available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/ll.10/fileshare.html.
67. Id.
68. Desai, supra note 65.
2010] 293
SMU Science and Technology Law Review
themselves more vulnerable to secondary liability for unwitting participation
as middle-men in fraudulent or otherwise unauthorized transactions.69 It is
unlikely that ISPs would freely sacrifice any of their existing immunity under
Section 512 of the Code by participating in data collection or enforcement at
the direction of third parties.70 The addition of explicit statutory immunities
would serve to reduce transaction costs and ensure participation by ISPs.
In short, questions remain concerning the determination of the basis and
frequency of collecting fees. Current rates for "bits" uses vary considerably
along with the procedures for their determination. Uniformity of units, rates,
and methods for measuring usage would be necessary to implement any col-
lective rights licensing scheme. Whichever mechanism is chosen to deter-
mine an aggregate online use fee would need to take into account the rights
of reproduction, distribution, and public performance.
Lastly, there are market disruption concerns. Introduction of a new
mandatory collective rights licensing system could accelerate the decline in
physical media sales which, despite the trend, still represent a substantial
percentage of the world's media sales market.7' Industry experts argue for a
more gradual transition away from physical distribution technology in order
to allow media companies to successfully cross the chasm and develop a
more robust and diversified digital distribution market.72 Some new media
services such as Hulu, iTunes, and Netflix are posting positive results and
experiencing successful growth in new markets.73 These new markets are
centered around convenient distribution of high quality digital content, and
many experts believe they will grow into billion-dollar industries.74 A new
mandatory collective rights system might cut off this growth at the knees,
superseding or otherwise disrupting the business of legal downloading
services.
At best, a compulsory collective licensing scheme would be difficult to
implement and would require a departure from market-based economics in a
society defined by its strict adherence to capitalism. Even if a compulsory
system is implemented, it would be difficult for such a system to simultane-
ously address the concerns of both rights holders and new businesses.
69. Id.
70. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000).
71. See Fisher 1U, supra note 31, at 62 n.51.
72. Peter DiCola, The Economics of Recorded Music: From Free Market to Just
Plain Free, FUTURE OF MUSIC COAL., July 16, 2000, available at http://future-
ofmusic.org/article/economics-recorded-music.




VII. Or-IN IN ExCHANGE FOR COVENANT NOT TO SUE: THE
VOLUNTARY ALTERNATIVE
The most commonly proposed alternative to a government-mandated
collective licensing scheme is a voluntary collective-rights licensing scheme.
A voluntary scheme would consist of a private agreement between rights
holders and users. Rights holders would sign a covenant not to sue any users
who opt in to pay licensing fees for media they consume. In exchange, any
user opting into the agreement would obtain an unlimited right to download
copyrighted content. As part of the agreement, the user would agree not to
share copyrighted content with anyone who had not opted in, or face mone-
tary penalties. Those users opting out of paying the fees would remain liable
for copyright infringement and thus subject to prosecution. Creators and
rights holders would also have the ability to opt out of this licensing scheme.
ISPs would receive only an administrative fee in connection with the opt-in
arrangement while newly created CROs would be responsible for tracking
media consumption and distributing royalties to rights holders.
Supporters of voluntary collective rights licensing contend that any so-
lution to digital piracy "should minimize government intervention in favor of
market forces because "[m]arket-driven solutions are likely to work faster,
and more efficiently, than top-down government regimes."75 For example,
proponents believe that file sharing networks will rapidly improve once the
cloud of copyright litigation is eliminated.76 An additional benefit is that an
opt-in system would be more respectful of individual subscriber preferences
and rights; only those who are interested in downloading or otherwise shar-
ing entertainment on the Internet would pay for such activities. As with the
government-mandated system, opt-in users would have completely legal ac-
cess to the virtually unlimited selection of media available on file-sharing
networks. However, unlike the mandatory public-right option, users would
not be forced to pay for media content if they do not choose to access it. This
freedom of choice-to pay or not to pay-could also help repair the general
bad perception many consumers now have regarding copyright owners. In
addition, it might clarify for the general public the degree to which artists and
creative industries rely on clearly defined rights and responsibilities for copy-
right owners, intermediaries, and users.
The most striking benefit of a voluntary collective licensing system is
that copyright law need not be amended to implement it. Also, instead of
relying on a government or collective industry board to set rates as with
mechanical licenses or ringtone rates, CROs would set their own prices, and
the market would dictate price fluctuations. Rights holders could potentially
make more money through volume with a lower price and a larger base of
subscribers than with the current system of high prices and expensive-and
75. von Lohmann, supra note 3, at 1.
76. Id. at 2.
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ultimately ineffective-enforcement efforts.77 In addition, there could be a
rise in the development of commercial services that would include the user
opt-in agreement into the terms and conditions of the service, and then pro-
vide free, basic, and premium services at different price points, including free
advertising-supported services.
Moreover, "[p]roponents of opt-in licensing schemes argue that so long
as the fee is reasonable, effectively invisible to fans, and does not restrict
their freedom, the vast majority of file sharers will opt to pay rather than
engage in complex evasion efforts."78 These proponents also "contend that
the vast majority of file sharers would be willing to pay a reasonable fee for
the freedom and peace of mind to download whatever they like using
whatever software suits them."79 They further argue that a compulsory li-
cense is not necessary, as artists will be incentivized to join a CRO by the
prospect of receiving some compensation for their works.8o Those choosing
to remain outside the system will be without a practical means of receiving
compensation for the file sharing.81 These proponents continue to argue that
it is very possible that if a large contingent of "major music copyright owners
joins a collecting society, the vast majority of smaller copyright owners will
have a strong incentive to join, just as virtually all professional songwriters
and music publishers opt to join ASCAP, BMI, or SESAC."82
Further arguments in favor of a voluntary licensing system stress that
"the distribution bottleneck that has limited the opportunities of independent
artists will be eliminated."83 Artists will have the benefit of being "able to
choose any road to online popularity-including, but no longer limited to, a
major label contract."84 This will assist artists as compensated "digital distri-
bution will be equally available to all artists."85 Also, with regard to promo-
tion, "artists will be able to use any mechanism they like, rather than having
to rely on major labels to push radio play."86 Thus, it could be argued that
with an increased number of "options from which artists may choose, record-
ing contracts will be more balanced than the one-sided deals" which artists
have complained of in the past.87 Another criticism of the way the industry
77. Id. at 3.
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has operated is the complexity of individual music-industry contracts. The
propensity of successful artists to sign several different contracts over time
"make[s] it very difficult for record labels and music publishers to be sure
what rights they control."88 So the proponents' argument stands to reason
that by joining a CRO, copyright owners would not be asked to itemize their
rights, but would "instead simply covenant not to sue those who pay the
blanket license fee."89 This would create a win-win situation in which "mu-
sic fans and innovators [would not be] held back by the internal contractual
squabbles that plague the music industry."90
However, many of the same concerns that were identified above in ref-
erence to a government-mandated collective rights licensing scheme will also
plague a voluntary one.91 These concerns include privacy issues, data-collec-
tion difficulties, derivative rights, trouble maintaining ISP immunity, file-
quality issues, and complexities in making sure that artists and other rights
holders are actually paid their fair share. 92 Also, like a compulsory license,
the opt-in license tends to flatten the market for sales of music and other
media, a consequence which could stifle innovation because there would not
be an incentive to produce new media products.93 In addition, there is the
problem of "free riding," whereby those who opt out of paying the fee can
still get free content from those who opt in. This can be done by either re-
routing their Internet connections or by simply having someone who opts in
burn the content onto CD or DVD and then share the content with someone
who opts out. 94
Uncertainty also exists as to how far these covenants not to sue will go.
Will copyright holders retain the right to sue an ISP for secondary liability if
it allows, even unwittingly, a user to re-route his connection? "Consumers
may also be at serious risk in a world where authorized and unauthorized
works are at their fingertips with no clear ability to distinguish between the
two."95 Would a green "OK" tag pop up on media you could use? Would
you only be able to use "opt-in approved" services that bear the equivalent of
a Good Housekeeping seal of approval, making the choices of opt-in users no
88. Id. at 5.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Brandon Evenson, IP Osgoode Speaks: Chris Castle on Voluntary Collective
Licensing, IP OSGOODE, Oct. 27, 2009, available at www.iposgoode.ca/20091
10/ip-osgoode-speaks-chris-castle-on-voluntary-collective-licensing.
92. 92 Id.
93. DiCola, supra note 72.
94. von Lohmann, supra note 3, at 5.
95. Desai, supra note 65.
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different than the choices they have today with the legal services?96 Further-
more, what incentive is there for ISPs to cooperate and take on the additional
burdens of tracking and recording who is accessing content and allocating a
reasonable fee?97 What is to keep them from demanding a larger and larger
portion of the fees being collected from users?98 Already in the mobile con-
tent arena, retailers and promoters of mobile content must operate their busi-
ness using 50% or less of their product prices, because the mobile service
providers collect 50% for delivering the mobile data services. Given that a
substantial segment of the population is currently accessing content free of
charge, how can content holders be sure that enough people opt in that it will
make the system worthwhile?99
Opponents of voluntary opt-in services cite a wide variety of reasons
why they believe proponents to be, for the most part, myopic about the incen-
tives present in human nature and capitalist societies.oo For instance, "pro-
ponents of the generic proposal and its offshoots seem to have given
insufficient consideration to the many, many details involved in ISP licens-
ing. The devil is, of course, in the details, and even considering a music-only
licensing method creates a devilish predicament indeed."oI Hence, the main
problem that an opt-in collective-rights licensing system faces is the same
problem faced by any new product introduced into a new market: getting
users to try something new. For the new users, the benefits are unclear, and
they may have a concern that they are putting their names on a list that may
someday be submitted for prosecution of copyright infringement, whether the
infringement was witting or unwitting.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In the United States, we inherited the current copyright regime from
Europe, and it was developed over hundreds of years of trial and error. And
the current system works for our culture.102 It can adapt to new technologies
and changing business models. Past collective licensing systems, including
schemes with compulsory licensing, have been successfully applied to public
performances, radio, and mechanical licenses for affixing copyrighted works
96. See http://www.goodhousekeeping.com/product-testing/history/about-good-
housekeeping-seal (last visited Aug. 20, 2010).
97. Evenson, supra note 91.
98. Reihan Salam, The Music Industry's Extortion Scheme, SLATE, Apr. 25, 2008,
http://www.slate.com/id/2189888/.
99. Evenson, supra note 91.
100. Id.
101. Castle & Mitchell, supra note 35, at 7.
102. See Copyright Timeline: A History of Copyright, http://www.arl.org/pp/
ppcopyright/copyresources/copytimeline.shtml (last visited August 18, 2010).
298 [Vol. XIII
ISP Licensing
to a tangible medium.103 In these instances, the market was seen as "broken"
and in need of a fix. However, the Internet is not a problem to be fixed; it is
a set of opportunities. The Internet is a far more exciting technology than
recordings or radio because it is worldwide and allows for interaction, and it
is a means for commerce. A panoply of new businesses can develop, which
take advantage of these attributes. In fact, they are developing rapidly,
whether we choose to accept it or not. The key is to focus not on developing
a panacea to "fix" a single problem in time. Our concentration should be to
provide the basic ingredients upon which a new market, which fosters inno-
vation, can be built. Then we should get out of the way so that additional
centuries of trial and error can take place in which to create innovations that
benefit consumers as well as rights holders and business people. We believe
in a system of copyright protections for the benefit of all people, "[t]o pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts", as stated in our most impor-
tant legal document, the United States Constitution.104
103. Brian R. Day, Collective Management of Music Copyright in the Digital Age:
The Online Clearinghouse, 18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 195, 211 (2010).
104. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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